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The Takeaway © Mosbacher Institute 
Global Value Chains (GVCs) connect consumers in devel-
oped countries with workers in developing countries. 
Working conditions for workers in developing countries 
are often poor, and finding ways to improve wages and 
working conditions is a policy priority for companies, gov-
ernments, non-government organization (NGOs), and oth-
er stakeholders. Factory-level transparency alters incen-
tives and leads to improved working conditions.  
The collapse of Bangladesh’s Rana Plaza in 2013 was one of 
the most horrific events among several that put developing-
country working conditions in the news. In 2020, reports 
emerged that the workforce in some Chinese factories includ-
ed forcibly relocated Uyghur Muslims in slave-like conditions. 
During the COVID-19 crisis, clothing shoppers stayed home, 
causing international buyers to stop orders from developing 
countries. In response to these problems, the European Union 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Forced labor and other adverse 
working conditions in global 
value chains continue to be 
reported in the media. 
The Ruggie Principles provide a 
framework for incorporating 
human rights issues into supply 
chain regulations. 
Throughout the 2010s, a variety 
of institutions have sought to 
implement the protocols and 
other regulations. 
Factory-level transparency is 
associated with improvements 
in working conditions. 
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has been taking a regulatory approach, telling 
corporations what to do, but not how to actu-
ally improve working conditions. Previously-
applied methods to improve working condi-
tions have had limited success. One method 
that shows promise is transparency: making 
factory-level working conditions publicly 
available. Recent Mosbacher Institute re-
search shows that transparency is associated 
with improved working conditions in garment 
factories.  
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO POOR 
WORKING CONDITIONS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  
Since the early 1990s, developing countries 
have increasingly participated in global value 
chains. The rise in exports from developing 
countries came with increased awareness of 
poor working conditions and human rights 
violations. To address the tension that arose 
between governments, business, unions, and 
non-government organizations (NGOs), Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary General of 
the United Nations John Ruggie, in 2007, laid 
out the “protect, respect, and remedy” princi-
ples to assist governments, corporations, and 
civil society “reduce the adverse human rights 
consequences” of supply chains.1  
The first layer of the Ruggie Principles calls on 
governments to leverage their unique posi-
tion to address corporate human rights issues 
domestically and internationally. The second 
layer argues that corporations should proac-
tively address how existing and proposed pol-
icy will impact human rights within their sup-
ply chain. Due diligence procedures—
monitoring, assessing, and integration—for 
human rights, help corporations avoid being 
complicit in exploiting forced labor and better 
protect human rights within their supply 
chains. 
Finally, grievance mechanisms must be in 
place to redress human rights abuses. These 
can include, but are not limited to, judicial 
mechanisms, credible non-judicial mecha-
nisms, corporate-level mechanisms, and state 
sponsored non-judicial mechanisms. Adjudi-
cation through any of these means  is a 
lengthy and costly process, which helps in-
crease the incentives to proactively address 
human rights concerns before they reach ad-
judication. 
IMPLEMENTING RUGGIE PRINCIPLES 
WITH REGULATIONS 
The EU and international community have 
taken a regulatory approach towards imple-
menting the Ruggie principles. The 2011 Unit-
ed Nations Guiding Principles on Human 
Rights called on states, as well as corpora-
tions, to protect human rights in their supply 
chains with more explicit steps,2 including an 
approach to promote due diligence and re-
sponsible supply chain management.3 The Eu-
ropean Union, in 2014, issued a directive—
later enacted into binding legislation in 27 
member states—enhancing the sustainability 
of European supply chains. Under these regu-
lations, corporations within member states 
must report on a myriad of sustainability is-
sues, including human rights conditions with-
in their supply chains.4  
In February 2017, the French National Assem-
bly adopted a “Duty of Vigilance Law” that 
forces multinational corporations operating in 
France to develop and implement a multi-



































































vent the most serious violations or face poten-
tial losses in civil court from damages that 
arise from not having a plan in place.5 
France’s Constitutional Court upheld most of 
the legislation in March 2017, except civil 
penalties for companies who fail to develop a 
diligence plan. 
The International Labor Organization, in May 
2017, published the ILO Declaration of Princi-
ples Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy. The declaration outlines 
principles in employment, training, work and 
living conditions, and industrial relations to 
assist corporations in making positive contri-
butions to economic and social policy.6  
Finally, more specific legislation addresses 
certain human rights concerns. For example, 
the United Kingdom’s 2015 Modern Slavery 
Act and California Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act work to reduce slavery and human 
trafficking in global supply chains by criminal-
izing slavery and forcing companies to dis-
close their efforts in reducing slavery in their 
supply chains, respectively.7  
In November 2019, the Finish government 
convened a conference which highlighted the 
need for enhanced corporate social responsi-
bility, especially in protecting human rights. 
At the conference, activists, NGOs, and busi-
nesses presented various outlines for decreas-
ing the human impact of global supply 
chains.8  
TRANSPARENCY AS A TOOL TO            
IMPROVE COMPLIANCE 
The regulatory push to improve working con-
ditions in supply chains tells corporations 
what to do, but not how to do it. Finding specif-
ic policies that change the incentives factories 
face surrounding compliance is a policy prior-
ity. Factories and buyers have tried several 
approaches, including voluntary monitoring 
(when firms or factories are responsible for 
monitoring compliance within their supply 
chains) and independent audits that have not 
effectively improved working conditions. In-
stead, policymakers, companies, and academ-
ics are considering whether adding other 
measures to audits might have a higher 
chance of success and, if so, which approaches 
might be most effective.  
One approach that has found to be effective at 
a relatively low cost is transparency. Trans-
parency involves making factory-level compli-
ance information public. The private sector 
already embraces financial disclosure and 
transparency. Transparency has been pro-
moted as a way to improve government and 
private sector performance. In the case of la-
bor standards, transparency theoretically in-
creases the benefits of compliance for facto-
ries because stakeholders may accurately re-
ward compliant firms and increase the costs 
of non-compliance.  
My recent research published in the ILR Re-
view9 evaluates the change in compliance as-
sociated with the implementation of a trans-
parency policy in Cambodia. A 1999 U.S.-
Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement 
formally linked market access to labor stand-
Results suggest that factories 
respond to the incentives 
generated by transparency in 




































































ards and lead to the creation of, the ILO’s 
Better Factories Cambodia program. This 
program assesses working conditions rela-
tive to ILO Core Labor Standards and Cam-
bodian labor law and implemented a policy 
to make these assessments publicly availa-
ble. Relative to areas not covered by the 
transparency program, the empirical anal-
ysis reveals that compliance increased in 
21 critical issues. The results suggest that 
factories respond to the incentives gener-
ated by transparency in ways that improve 
compliance. International buyers, govern-
ments, and other stakeholders can there-
fore consider transparency as a powerful 
tool for supporting human rights in global 
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